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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTI- N 
Vpf.^ 'J I mi St..uil'.' ' .in ' ;"•-.; '' ... -;gs this appeal 
from the decision of the Second Judic.il District Ccur* of D-v- - -
County, State of Utah, entered on A"-
jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann., §78-2-2(3)(j) (Supp. 
1991). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
PRESENTED FOR REVIEW AND THE 
STANDARDS OF REVIEW, 
1. Does the discretionary function provision of the 
Utah governmental immunity act, §63-30-10(1)(a), limit the waiver 
of immunity of governmental entities under §63-30-8 for injuries 
caused by a defective, unsafe or dangerous condition of any 
highway, road or street? The Supreme Court reviews this question 
using a de novo standard. Bonham v. Morgan, 788 P. 2d 497 (Utah 
1989) . 
2. Does the negligent inspection provision of the 
Utah Governmental Immunity Act, §63-30-10(1)(d), limit the waiver 
of immunity of governmental entities under §63-30-8 for injuries 
caused by a defective, unsafe or dangerous condition of any 
highway, road or street? The Supreme Court reviews this question 
using a de novo standard. Bonham v. Morgan, 788 P. 2d 497 (Utah 
1989) . 
3. Does a municipal corporation have a duty to 
motorists to remove sight obstructions from its streets, roads, 
and highways when those sight obstructions are located on private 
property? The Supreme Court reviews this question using a de 
novo standard. Bonham v. Morgan, 788 P.2d 497 (Utah 1989). 
4. Does a municipal corporation have a duty to warn 
individuals using its streets, roads and highways of dangerous or 
hazardous conditions the motorist may encounter on the roads? 
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The Supreme Court reviews this question using a de novo standard. 
Bonham v. Morgan, 788 P.2d 497 (Utah 1989). 
5. Does a municipal corporation have a duty to 
install traffic control devices at an intersection in order to 
eliminate dangerous or hazardous conditions in the intersections 
of its roads, streets or highways? The Supreme Court reviews 
this question using a de novo standard. Bonham v. Morgan, 788 
P.2d 497 (Utah 1989). 
6. Is a duty on the part of a municipal corporation 
created or enhanced by its long-standing actual knowledge of a 
dangerous or unsafe condition of its roads, highways, or streets? 
The Supreme Court reviews this question using a de novo standard. 
Bonham v. Morgan, 788 P.2d 497 (Utah 1989). 
7. Does Utah Code Ann., §41-6-19 establish a duty for 
a municipal corporation to have sight obstructions on private 
property removed? The Supreme court reviews this question using 
a de novo standard. Bonham v. Morgan, 788 P.2d 497 (Utah 1989). 
8. Is Utah Code Ann., §41-6-19 mandatory or directory 
only? The Supreme court reviews this question using a de novo 
standard. Bonham v. Morgan, 788 P.2d 497 (Utah 1989). 
9. Given the outstanding discovery at the time and 
Rule 56(f) considerations, did the trial court err in denying the 
plaintiff's written Motion to Continue a decision on Bountiful's 
Motion for Summary Judgment? The Supreme Court reviews this 
question using an abuse of discretion standard. Strand v. 
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Associated Students of University of Utah, 561 P.2d 191 (Utah 
1977) • 
10. Assuming a duty on the part of a municipal 
corporation to remove sight obstructions on private property, 
install traffic control devices at intersections or warn 
motorists of dangerous street conditions, is there a genuine 
issue of fact about whether the defendant has fulfilled its duty 
in light of the information presented to the trial court? The 
Supreme Court reviews this question using a de novo standard. 
Bonham v. Morgan. 788 P.2d 497 (Utah 1989). 
STATUTES INVOLVED 
The following statutes are controlling in this action: 
Utah Code Ann., §41-6-19. 
(1) The owner of real property 
shall remove from his property any 
tree, plant, shrub, or other 
obstruction, or part of it, which, 
by obstructing the view of any 
operator, constitutes a traffic 
hazard. 
(2) When the Department of 
Transportation or any local 
authority determines upon the basis 
of an engineering and traffic 
investigation that a traffic hazard 
exists, it shall notify the owner 
and order that the hazard be 
removed within ten days. 
Utah Code Ann.. §63-30-10(1)(a) and (d). 
(1) Immunity from suit of all 
governmental entities is waived for 
injury proximately caused by a 
negligent action or omission of an 
employee committed with the scope 
of employment except if the injury: 
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(a) Arises out of the 
exercise or performance 
of the failure to 
exercise or perform a 
discretionary function, 
whether or not the 
discretion is abused. 
(d) Arises out of a 
failure to make an 
inspection, or by reason 
of making an inadequate 
or negligent inspection 
of any property. 
Utah Code Ann., §63-30-8. 
Immunity from suit of all 
governmental entities is waived for 
any injury caused by a defective, 
unsafe, or dangerous condition of 
any highway, road, street, alley, 
crosswalk, sidewalk, culvert, 
tunnel, bridge, viaduct, or other 
structure located thereon. 
S T A T E M E N T O F T H E C A S E 
A. Nature of the case 
Jones was severely brain-damaged as a result of an 
accident which occurred at an intersection improperly maintained 
by Bountiful City Corporation ("Bountiful"). Jones filed this 
action against Bountiful alleging a failure to properly mark the 
intersection, failure to remove or order the removal of foliage 
obscuring the vision of motor vehicle operators using the 
intersection and a failure to maintain safe highways, roads, and 
streets. 
Summary Judgment was ordered prior to the completion of 
the discovery cut off on the grounds of governmental immunity 
under §63-30-10 (1) (a) and on the grounds that Bountiful had no 
duty to remove obstructing foliage from private property. Jones 
argued that the governmental immunity was waived under §63-3 0-8 
and that under that statute, Utah Code Ann., §41-6-19 and common 
law Bountiful had a duty to remove obstructing foliage. 
B. Course of the Proceedings and Disposition Below 
The Complaint in this action was filed in August of 
1988. In January of 1991 the court set dispositive dates for 
hearing motions and completion of discovery. The discovery cut 
off was April 22, 1991. Bountiful moved for summary judgment as 
to all claims against it on January 30, 1991 and the matter was 
heard at oral argument on February 26, 1991. The court issued a 
minute entry ruling on the Motion for Summary Judgment on March 
21, 1991 and it was reduced to a signed Order on April 29, 1991. 
On March 29, 1991, prior to the time the Court's ruling was 
reduced to a signed Order, Jones filed his Motion for 
Reconsideration. The Court entered its ruling on the Motion for 
Reconsideration on April 25, 1991 and it was reduced to an Order 
on May 20, 1991. Jones filed his Notice of Appeal on May 17, 
1991. 
C. Statement of Facts 
1. On September 13, 1987, Jones drove his motor vehicle 
eastbound on Beverly Way in Bountiful. As Jones entered the 
intersection he collided with another vehicle traveling 
southbound on 12 00 East. Complaint, p. 1, R. 1. 
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2. The collision left Jones severely brain-damaged• Jones is 
unable to engage in his regular daily affairs and has suffered a 
loss of enjoyment of life. Complaint, p. 2, R. 2. 
3. The intersection of Beverly Way and 1200 East is an open 
intersection, that is, one that has no traffic control device for 
individuals using the intersection. Defendant Bountiful City's 
Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Motion for 
Summary Judgment, p. 2., R. 90. 
4. Rosebushes growing on the northwest corner of the 
intersection of Beverly Way and 1200 East obstructed the vision 
of southbound and eastbound traffic at the intersection at the 
time of the accident. Exhibit "A" - deposition of Ms. Dorothy 
Carol Bloss, pp., 5-15, 30; Exhibit "B11 - deposition of Cindy B. 
Paxman, pp. 36,37; Exhibit "C" - deposition of Kevin O'Connell, 
pp. 6-15. 
5. The obstructing foliage is located on private property owned 
by Rowena Beavers. Defendant Bountiful City's Memorandum of 
Points and Authorities in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment, 
pp. 2-3, R. 90-91; Plaintiff's Memorandum of Points and 
Authorities in Opposition to Motion for Summary Judgment, p. 2, 
R. 112. 
6. On September 6, 1985, Dorothy Carol Bloss was in an accident 
at the intersection of Beverly Way and 12 00 East involving 
southbound and eastbound cars. Immediately after the accident 
Ms. Bloss contacted Layne Forbes, Bountiful City Prosecutor, and 
Jack Balling, Bountiful City Engineer, to complain about the 
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rosebushes on Rowena Beaver's property blocking her vision and 
causing the accident. Exhibit "A", pp. 5-15, 30. 
7. A couple of months prior to Jones' accident, Ms. Dixie 
Jacobs, who resides one house south of the intersection of 
Beverly Way and 1200 East contacted a Bountiful City Official to 
complain about the dangerousness of the intersection. The 
Bountiful City official told Ms. Jacobs that a committee was 
reviewing the intersection of Beverly Way and 12 00 East. 
Affidavit of Dixie Jacobs, pp. 1,2, R. 276, 277. 
8. On August 14, 1987, Kevin O'Connell was traveling eastbound 
on Beverly Way when he struck a vehicle traveling southbound on 
1200 East. Kevin O'Connell complained to Officer Carl Krall, 
Sergeant Winters, and the Bountiful City Prosecutor that his 
vision was obstructed by rosebushes located on Rowena Beavers' 
"property. Exhibit "C", pp. 6-15. 
9. At the time Bountiful's Motion for Summary Judgment came on 
for hearing on February 26, 1991, Jones was awaiting response 
from Bountiful of outstanding Requests for Production of 
Documents that were sent to Bountiful on January 31, 1991. R. 
35, 36. 
10. At the time of hearing on Bountiful's Motion, Jones had also 
scheduled the depositions of Bountiful City officials regarding 
notice they had of the sight obstruction on Ms. Beavers' 
property. R. 101-104. 
11. Four days before the hearing on Bountiful!s Motion for 
Summary Judgment, Jones, through his attorney, filed under Rule 
8 
56(f), U.R.C.P., a Motion to Continue a decision on Bountiful!s 
Motion for Summary Judgment until additional discovery was 
completed. Exhibit "D" - Motion to contnue, pp. 1,2, R. 134-13 6. 
12. At the hearing on Bountiful!s Motion for Summary Judgment on 
February 26, 1991, Jones1 counsel reiterated the need to continue 
consideration of Bountiful1s Motion and explained in detail why a 
complete factual basis was not available to the plaintiff without 
being allowed to carry on additional discovery. Transcript of 
Hearing on Motion for Summary Judgment, pp. 13-16. 
13. At the hearing, the trial court informed counsel for both 
parties that oral argument would go forth that day but that 
counsel would be permitted to submit supplemental briefs as 
discovery progressed before a decision was rendered. Transcript 
of Hearing on Motion for Summary Judgment, p. 16, lines 15-19. 
14. After oral argument on February 26, 1991 but before issuance 
of the March 21, 1991 ruling on the Motion for Summary Judgment 
by the Court, Jones1 counsel reiterated his understanding that 
additional briefing would be allowed and proposed a time frame 
for submitting those supplemental memoranda. Plaintiff's 
Memorandum in support of Motion for Reconsideration, p. 1, R. 
158, Exhibit !fElf - letter from Brian S. King to Judge Cornaby 
dated March 19, 1991. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
Bountiful had a mandatory statutory duty under §63-3 0-8 
and §41-6-19, Utah Code. Ann. , and a common law duty to provide 
safe streets free of obstructing foliage. Additionally, 
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Bountiful had a duty to warn of the dangerous nature of the 
intersection until it was made safe either by removal of the 
obstruction, posting of a traffic control device, or otherwise. 
The extent of Bountifulfs duty was dependent on their knowledge 
of the hazardous intersection. As such, whether Bountiful had a 
duty to provide safe streets in this case and whether that duty 
was breached are breached that duty is a genuine issues of 
material fact. Summary Judgment was improperly awarded because 
of these genuine issues and the fact that Jones1 discovery was 
not completed. 
I. BOUNTIFUL IS NOT IMMUNE FROM SUIT FOR INJURIES CAUSED BY ITS 
FAILURE TO KEEP FOLIAGE FROM OBSTRUCTING THE VIEW OF MOTOR 
VEHICLE OPERATORS. 
Bountiful is liable for Jones1 injuries under the Utah 
Governmental Immunity Act because it failed to remove a dangerous 
condition from its streets. The version of Utah Code Ann. , §63-
3 0-8 in effect at the date of the accident stated: 
Immunity from suit of all 
governmental entities is waived for 
any injury caused by a defective, 
unsafe, or dangerous condition of 
any highway, road, street, alley, 
crosswalk, sidewalk, culvert, 
tunnel, bridge, viaduct, or other 
structure located thereon. 
However, Bountiful claims that the actions of which the 
plaintiff complains fall under the discretionary function and/or 
negligent inspection clauses of the Governmental Immunity Act, 
U.C.A. §63-3-10(1) (a) and §63-30-10(1) (d) : 
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(1) Immunity from suit of all 
governmental entities is waived for 
injury proximately caused by a 
negligent action or omission of an 
employee committed within the scope 
of employment except if the injury: 
(a) Arises out of the 
exercise or performance 
or the failure to 
exercise or perform a 
discretionary function, 
whether or not the 
discretion is abused; 
(d) arises out of a 
failure to make an 
inspection, or by reason 
of making an inadequate 
or negligent inspection 
of any property. 
A. The relationship between U.C.A. 563-30-8 and §63-30-
10(1)(a). 
The first time this Court addressed the interaction 
between §63-30-8 and §63-30-10(1)(a) was in Sanford v. University 
of Utah, 26 Utah 2d. 285, 488 P.2d 741 (1971). The Sanford court 
found that the manner in which the Governmental Immunity Act was 
drafted indicated that the legislature did not intend Section 10 
with its exceptions to modify other aspects of the Act, including 
Section 8. The Court found this was true because " . . . the 
waiver of immunity in Sections 8 and 9 encompasses a much broader 
field of tort liability than merely negligent conduct of 
employees within the scope of their employment . . . " 488 P. 2d 
at 745. 
This Court touched on the relationship between §63-30-
10(1)(a) and §63-30-8 again in Biqelow v. Ingersoll. 618 P.2d 50 
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(Utah 1980) . As in the present case, Biaelow v. Inaersoll 
involved a claim against a municipality for failure to provide 
adequate traffic control devices at an intersection and the 
defense of discretionary function. Biaelow holds that the acts 
of a governmental entity in designing a traffic control system do 
not involve a discretionary function under 63-30-10(1)(a)• 
Biaelow also suggests that §63-30-8 imposes liability for injury 
from any unsafe or dangerous condition of highways regardless of 
the degree of discretion involved. 
Again, in Bowen v. Riverton City, 656 P. 2d 434 (Utah 
1982), this Court reversed a trial court's Summary Judgment 
granted under very similar factual circumstances. In Bowen, a 
personal injury plaintiff brought a claim against Riverton City 
for failure to maintain a stop sign that had fallen down at an 
intersection. The Court granted the city's summary judgment 
motion. On appeal, this Court reversed the trial court and held 
that the city's duty to maintain safe streets was non-delegable 
and the question of whether that duty had been fulfilled was one 
of fact to be determined by a jury. Id. at 437. As in Bowen, 
Summary Judgment in the present case was improperly awarded. 
Once it is determined that the discretionary function clause does 
not modify or limit §63-30-8, it is clear that whether Bountiful 
discharged its duty to maintain the safe condition of its streets 
is not something that can be resolved on Summary Judgment. 
This Court addressed the §63-30-8 discretionary 
function relationship again in a recent case with remarkable 
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factual similarity, Richards v. Leavitt, 716 P. 2d 276 (Utah 
1985). Richards involved a plaintiff who alleged that a city was 
negligent in allowing trees, shrubs, and other growth to obscure 
a stop sign at an intersection• 
This Court stated: 
Recent Utah case law involving 
similar facts to those before us 
supports our holding here that the 
maintenance and repair of traffic 
signs is a governmental function 
from which immunity from suit has 
been expressly waived and which is 
not within the discretionary 
function exception, [emphasis 
added] 
Id., at 279. 
Richards also stated that such a ruling was consistent 
with the majority of jurisdictions which have abolished "the 
traditional proprietary-governmental analysis, irrespective of 
whether their analyses are based on specific statutory provisions 
or the broader exceptions to discretionary function exceptions 
like those found in §63-30-10 of the Utah Act." Richards is a 
clear statement that the theory upon which Bountiful bases its 
position is untenable. 
The plaintiff's argument is reinforced by the 1991 Utah 
legislature's amendment to §63-30-8. The amendment allows §63-
30-10 to limit the waiver of immunity found in §63-30-8 and 
highlights the fact that, prior to 1991, §63-30-8 was not limited 
in any way by the discretionary function clause. The intent of 
§63-3 0-8 in 1987 to waive governmental immunity is clear and 
should be enforced. 
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B. The relationship between U.C.A. 563-30-8 and 563-30-
10(1)(d). 
While the Bowen court held that the question of 
municipal liability for failure to inspect a stop sign should be 
submitted to a jury, no Utah cases directly address the 
relationship between §63-30-8 and §63-30-10(1)(d). However, 
there is no reason that the case law and principles outlined 
above relating to the discretionary function clause should not 
apply with equal force to the negligent inspection clause. 
II. BOUNTIFUL HAS BOTH A STATUTORY AND COMMON LAW DUTY TO 
FACILITATE THE REMOVAL OF FOLIAGE FROM PRIVATE LAND WHICH 
OBSTRUCTS THE VIEW OF MOTOR VEHICLE OPERATORS. 
A. 541-6-19 imposed a duty on Bountiful to remove or 
compel Rowena Beavers to remove obstructing foliage. 
Section 41-6-19(2) of the Utah Code imposes a duty upon 
Bountiful to ensure the removal of foliage on private property 
that obstructs the view of motor vehicle operators. 
§41-6-19 in full states: 
(1) The owner of real property 
shall remove from his property any 
tree, plant, shrub, or other 
obstruction, or part of it, which, 
by obstructing the view of any 
operator, constitutes a traffic 
hazard. 
(2) When the Department of 
Transportation or any local 
authority determines upon the basis 
of an engineering and traffic 
investigation that a traffic hazard 
exists, it shall notify the owner 
and order that the hazard be 
removed within ten days. 
Utah Code. Ann., §41-6-19. 
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Bountiful had actual notice of the traffic hazard 
created by the foliage on Beaver's property based on at least 
three separate complaints provided by city residents dating back 
to at least two years and, at latest, one month before the 
plaintiff's accident. See Statement of Facts, paragraphs 6-8. 
These repeated, direct attempts to bring the dangerous condition 
of the intersection to the attention of a number of separate 
Bountiful City officials constitute the type of notice required 
by the statute. 
Based on its knowledge of the foliage problem, 
Bountiful had a duty to notify Beavers as required by §41-6-19(2) 
and order her to remove the obstructing foliage. Bountiful 
breached its duty by not taking any action to provide such 
notice. Jones alleges this failure on Bountifulfs part was a 
proximate cause of his injuries. The extent to which there was a 
duty based on notice to the city, breach and a cause of harm to 
Jones are questions for the jury. 
B. Bountifulfs duty under §41-6-19 is mandatory rather 
than discretionary. 
Under the language of §41-6-19, Bountiful's duty to 
ensure the removal of the foliage was mandatory rather than 
discretionary. This court stated in Board of Education of 
Granite School District v. Salt Lake County, 659 P.2d 1030 (Utah 
1983): 
Generally those directions that are 
not of the essence of the thing to 
be done, but which are given with a 
view merely to the proper, 
ordinary, and prompt conduct of 
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business and by failure to obey no 
prejudice will occur to those whose 
rights are protected by the 
statute, are not commonly 
considered mandatory . . . The 
provision will not be considered 
mandatory if the purpose of the 
statute has been substantially 
complied with and no substantial 
rights have been jeopardized. 
Board of Education at 1033 quoting 
Kennecott Copper V. Salt Lake City, 
575 P.2d 705 (Utah 1978). 
The Board of Education case held that because the 
plaintiff had been prejudiced and the language of the statute 
included the word "shall" the statute would be interpreted as 
imposing a mandatory duty on the state. The same is true in the 
present case. 
In the cases of Helsten v. Schwendiman, 668 P. 2d 509 
(Utah 1983), and Moore v. Schwendiman, 750 P.2d 204 (Utah App. 
1988), the courts reviewed provisions of Utah Code Ann., §41-6-
44.10, dealing with the procedures to be followed in revoking the 
drivers licenses of persons charged with D.U.I. These code 
provisions are from the same chapter of the Motor Vehicle Code as 
§41-6-19. The issue in both cases is the interpretation of 
provisions requiring the making of a sworn statement by a police 
officer and the timing of submitting the statement. The courts 
held that the provisions of §41-6-44.10 are mandatory. The Moore 
court stated: 
A statute is regarded as directory 
when no substantial rights depend 
on it, no injury can result from 
ignoring it, and the purpose of the 
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legislation can be accomplished in 
a manner other than that prescribed 
with substantially the same 
results, 
Moore at 206, quoting Wilcox v. Billings, 438 P. 2d 108 (Kansas 
1968). 
Bountiful!s duty under §41-6-19 is mandatory, Mr. 
Jones1 substantial rights have been interfered with because 
Bountiful ignored its duty to give notice to Rowena Beavers to 
remove obstructing foliage from private land. When read 
together, §41-6-19 and 63-30-8 make it clear that the legislature 
intended to establish a duty for municipalities to maintain safe 
roads by removing obstructing foliage wherever it occurs. 
Even if it is read as being directory only, Board of 
Education indicates there is still a legal duty and that 
Bountiful must be in "substantial compliance" with the statute to 
discharge that duty. Board of Education at 1033. There is no 
indication of any type that Bountiful ever made any attempt to 
give any type of notice whatsoever to Rowena Beavers. The 
statutory duty remains unfulfilled under Bountiful fs own 
argument. 
C. Bountiful has a common law duty to warn of and/or remove 
foliage which obstructs the view of motor vehicle operators. 
In addition to a statutory responsibility, Bountiful 
has a common law duty to remove dangerous obstructions in order 
to make its streets safe. 
McQuillan on Municipal Corporations, §54.69.a, p. 234 
states: 
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. whether or not obstructions to view 
growing at or near an intersection constitute 
a danger or hazard to a prudent motorist 
presents a genuine issue of material fact 
regarding a municipalities1 negligence. And 
where a city knowingly maintains an 
intersection right-of-way in a manner which 
dangerously obstructs the visions of 
motorists using the streets, a city is liable 
for its failure to warn of the danger and, if 
necessary, make safe the defective condition. 
[emphasis added] 
This duty to warn of hazardous conditions on the public 
roads is re-emphasized in other sections of McQuillan: 
. . . a municipality which controls 
a roadway has a duty to warn 
motorists of hazards adjacent to 
the roadway even if the hazard 
itself is not within the control of 
the municipality . . . the duty of 
the municipality to take proper 
precautions by guards or barriers, 
and lights at night, or some other 
reasonable manner of the danger 
some other reasonable manner of the 
danger occasioned by the 
obstructions is uniformly enforce 
and failure in this respect is 
negligence. 
Id., §54.90a, p. 335. McQuillan also states: 
A municipality is required to 
exercise ordinary care to guard or 
warn travelers against such 
injuries as might be reasonably 
anticipated from dangers in its 
streets which may result from 
excavations or obstructions created 
by others . . . . [emphasis added] 
Id., at §54.91, pg. 339. 
McQuillan also states that the notice question becomes 
important when a defect in the street is caused by the act of the 
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third person. In those circumstances, the municipality is not 
liable unless it: 
. . . (a) has actual notice of the 
defect, or (b) of such facts and 
circumstances as with by the 
exercise of reasonable diligence 
lead a prudent person to such 
knowledge. 
Id., §54-102, p. 373. 
In seeking a recovery against a 
city for injuries due to an 
allegedly defective public way, it 
is only where the negligence relied 
on is the failure of the city to 
remove an obstruction or to repair 
a defect in the street, not caused 
by its own act or neglect, that the 
question of notice of obstruction 
or defect is an essential element. 
Id., §54-104, p. 378. 
Bountiful1s common law duty to facilitate removal of 
Ms. Beaver's foliage or at the very least warn motorists of the 
dangers presented by the rosebushes was established when its 
representatives were notified of the dangerous condition the 
foliage created. Both the degree of notice provided and whether 
Bountiful breached its duty to remove the foliage are material 
issues of fact that should be reviewed by a jury. The Summary 
Judgment should be set aside in light of Bountifulfs mandatory 
statutory and common law duties. This Court has stated, "If 
there is any issue as to any material fact, the motion should be 
denied." Ruffineao v. Miller, 579 P.2d 342 (Utah 1978). 
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III. THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN DENYING THE 
PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO CONTINUE AND IN GRANTING SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT BEFORE DISCOVERY WAS COMPLETED 
In the present case, the lower court improperly ordered 
summary judgment before the completion of discovery. As stated 
in Downtown Athletic Club v. Horman, 740 P. 2d 275 (Utah App.), 
cert den., 765 P.2d 1277 (1987), "Summary judgment should be 
withheld if discovery is incomplete because additional 
information may come to light that creates genuine issues of 
material fact." 
A number of cases have been cited in Utah in recent 
years regarding the factors a court should take account when 
faced with a Rule 56(f) Motion to Continue. In Strand v. 
Associated Students of University of Utah, 561 P.2d 191, 194 
(1977) this Court stated that: 
Unless dilatory or lacking in 
merit, the [Rule 56(f)] motion 
should be liberally treated. 
Exercising a sound discretion the 
trial court then determines whether 
the stated reasons are adequate. 
Strand also indicates that the affidavit required by Rule 56(f) 
need not be evidentiary in form butis was to provide the court 
with specific reasons showing why continuance of consideration of 
a Motion for Summary Judgment is necessary. Id. 
This Court was again faced with the issue of a 
premature granting of a Motion for Summary Judgment in 
Auerbach's, Inc. v. Kimball, 572 P.2d 376 (1977). In Auerbach's, 
the party opposing the Motion for Summary Judgment was waiting 
for responses to outstanding discovery at the time the opposition 
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to the motion was due. Based primarily on that fact, this Court 
reversed the trial courtfs granting of the Motion for Summary 
Judgment stating: 
The granting of the Motion for 
Summary Judgment was premature 
because Kimball's discovery was not 
then complete. It was the 
information sought in the 
proceedings for discovery, which 
Kimball claimed would infuse the 
issues with facts sufficient to 
defeat a Motion for Summary 
Judgment . . . . 
576 P.2d at 377. 
This Court in Cox v. Winters, 678 P.2d 311 (Utah 1984) 
likewise determined that when facts sought through discovery are 
in the possession of the moving party and the non-moving party 
has initiated discovery to gather those facts but time for 
discovery has not been completed or the moving party has not 
responded to the outstanding discovery, ordinarily the trial 
court should grant a Rule 56(f) motion. Id. at 313-315. 
Cases from the Court of Appeals since Cox have outlined 
additional considerations a trial court should take into account 
consider under Rule 56(f). The Court of Appeals in Callioux v. 
Progressive Insurance Company, 745 P.2d 838 (Utah App. 1987), 
quoting Moores Federal Practice, stated: 
The mere averment of exclusive 
knowledge or control of the facts 
by the moving party is not 
adequate. The opposing party must 
show to the best of his ability 
what facts are within the 
movementfs exclusive knowledge or 
control, what steps have been taken 
to obtain the desired information 
pursuant to discovery procedures 
under the rule, and that he is 
desirous of taking advantage of 
these discovery procedures. 
745 P.2d at 840-41. 
In addition, the Callioux court, relying on Cox v. 
Winters, delineated several factors to consider under Rule 56(f): 
Were the reasons articulated in the 
Rule 56(f) affidavit "adequate" or 
is the party against whom summary 
judgment is sought merely on a 
"fishing expedition" for purely 
speculative facts after a 
substantial discovery has been 
conducted without producing any 
significant evidence? (2) Was there 
sufficient time since the inception 
of the lawsuit for the party 
against whom the summary judgment 
is sought to use discovery 
procedures, and thereby cross-
examine the moving party? (3) If 
discovery procedures were timely 
initiated, was the non-moving party 
afforded an appropriate response? 
Id. 
Applying the law stated above to the facts of this 
case, it is evident that the trial court abused its discretion in 
denying Jones' Motion to Continue. In that Motion, to Continue 
and in greater detail at hearing on the Motion to Continue, 
counsel for the plaintiff outlined with specificity the need to 
delay ruling until the discovery cut off had expired or, at the 
very least, until the outstanding discovery at the time of the 
hearing was completed. Plaintiff's counsel outlined the need to 
determine the degree to which Bountiful had notice of the foliage 
problem and failed to act on that knowledge. In addition, 
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discovery was conducted as to the procedures that Bountiful had 
in place to insure compliance with notices given by the city to 
residents. Plaintiff's counsel informed the court that lack of 
information precluded the plaintiff's presentation by affidavit 
of facts essential to justify opposition to Bountiful's Motion. 
In addition, the fact that there was outstanding discovery in the 
form of Requests for Production of Documents and pending 
depositions was presented to the trial court. The best 
indication that these reasons were "adequate" and that Jones was 
not on a "fishing expedition" for purely speculative facts is 
that the discovery conducted between February 26, 1991 and the 
date the court ruled on the Motion for Reconsideration uncovered 
many crucial pieces of information from a wide variety of sources 
concerning Bountiful City's enforcement procedures for code 
violations, knowledge that it had of sight obstruction at the 
intersection, and the identity of individuals who had complained 
on numerous occasions to Bountiful City prior to the accident 
involving Jones. All of the information referred to in 
paragraphs 6-8 of the Statement of Facts, supra, was discovered 
after the date of the hearing on Bountifulfs Motion. 
Nevertheless, the trial court denied Jones' Motion to Continue 
and granted the Motion for Summary Judgment. 
As a result of the denial of the Motion to Continue and 
granting of the Motion for Summary Judgment, Jones was forced to 
resort to the filing of the Motion for Reconsideration to present 
these crucial facts uncovered after the February 26, 1991 
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hearing. Further discovery may have produced additional issues 
of material fact which would have helped defeat the summary 
judgment. For these reasons, the refusal of the trial court to 
grant continuance of the Rule 56(f) Motion was arbitrary and 
capricious and an abuse of the Court's discretion. 
CONCLUSION 
Bountiful has a mandatory statutory duty under §63-30-8 
and §41-6-19 and a common law duty to provide streets free from 
visually obstructing foliage. Bountiful had a duty to warn 
motorists of the traffic hazard created by the foliage. 
Additionally, Bountiful had a duty to install and maintain 
traffic control devices. Whether Bountiful breached its duties 
under the statutory or common law is a question of material fact 
to be presented to a jury. Summary judgment should not have been 
awarded because there are genuine issues of material fact and the 
defendant was not allowed to complete discovery which could have 
brought to light additional issues of material fact. 
The plaintiff respectfully requests that the Summary 
Judgment Order be reversed and that the case be remanded for 
trial on the merits with further instruction on the applicable 
law to guide the trial court. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED THIS j^_ D A Y 0 F JULY, 1991. 
GOICOECHEA LAW OFFICES 
/ > ^ ^ L c. p—; 
BRIAN S. KING 7 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
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LAYNE B. FORBES 
RUSSELL L. MAHAN 
Attorneys for Defendant 
790 South 100 East 
Bountiful, UT 84010 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR DAVIS COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STANLEY C JONES, by and through : 
his guardian, RAYLENE P. JONES 
: SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
Plaintiff, 
vs. : 
Civil No. 44129 
BOUNTIFUL CITY CORPORATION, a : 
Municipal Corporation, and 
John Does I through III : Judge Douglas Cornaby 
Defendant : 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
Defendant Bountiful City's Motion for Summary Judgment came on for 
hearing before the above entitled Court on February 6,1991. The Plaintiff was represented 
by Attorney Brian S. King, and the Defendant Bountiful City was represented by Layne B. 
Forbes, City Attorney. 
Having considered and reviewed the pleadings, affidavits, and Memorandums 
of Points and Authorities on file, and being fully advised in the premises, the Court finds and 
concludes: 
FILMED 
n m 9 .229 . 
(#1098) 
(#2059) 
1. The plaintiff was driving a motorcycle on Beverly Way at the 
intersection of 1200 East in Bountiful, Utah and was injured in a collision with a motor 
vehicle. 
2. The intersection was not controlled by any traffic control device. 
3. For purposes of the motion the Court will assume foliage from private 
land to some degree obscured the plaintiffs vision of the intersection. 
4. The waiver of Section 63-30-8, U.C.A,, 1953, does not apply to the 
failure to place traffic control devices at an intersection. The facts of this case are 
distinguished from cases in which a governmental unit has undertaken to control an 
intersection by traffic control devices. 
5. The fact that the defendant failed to determine if a traffic control 
device was warranted at this particular intersection was a discretionary function and bars 
recovery. 
6. The defendant has no duty to remove foliage from private property, 
even though the foliage may to some degree obscure visibility at the intersections. 
7. Section 63-30-8, U.C.A, 1953, refers to the failure of governmental 
agencies to maintain streets and intersections. The foliage in this place was not growing on 
the street or in the intersection, but was growing on private property. 
8. Additional discovery is not necessary for the court to rule on the duty 
to remove foliage from private property. 
9. The court determines that there is no just reason for delay and, 
0 0 1 2 3 3 3 
pursuant to Rule 54(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, the Court hereby directs the 
entry of final judgment as set forth below. 
NOW THEREFORE, it is hereby ORDERED, ADJUDGED and DECREED 
as follows: 
Defendant Bountiful City's Motion for Summary Judgment is hereby granted 
and the complaint is hereby dismissed with prejudice and upon the merits-
Dated this zs~ day of April, 1991. 
BY THE COURT: 
DougiasTZbrnaby 
District Judge 
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LAYNE B. FORBES (#1098) 
RUSSELL L. MAHAN (#2059) 
Attorneys for Defendant 
790 South 100 East 
Bountiful, UT 84010 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR DAVIS COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STANLEY C JONES, by and through 
his guardian, RAYLENE P. JONES 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
BOUNTIFUL CITY CORPORATION, a 
Municipal Corporation, and 
John Does I through III 
Defendant 
ORDER DENYING 
PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR 
RECONSIDERATION 
Civil No. 44129 
Judge Douglas Cornaby 
The plaintiff filed its Motion for Reconsideration on March 29,1991. Plaintiff 
was represented by Brian S. King, and the defendant Bountiful City was represented by 
Layne B. Forbes. 
The court recognizes there is generally no such motion as a Motion for 
Reconsideration. The court nevertheless has read all additional briefs submitted by the 
parties. 
The plaintiff requested oral arguments on the Motion for Reconsideration, and 
at the same time submitted a Notice to Submit for Decision. The court heard oral argument 
heretofore in defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment The plaintiff is not permitted oral 
argument additionally, and is not entitled to reconsideration even though the court has given 
reconsideration. Therefore, based on the foregoing and being fully advised in the premises: 
It is hereby ORDERED that plaintiffs Motion for Reconsideration is denied. 
Dated this day of May, 1991. 
BY THE COURT: 
Douglas Cornaby 
District Judge 
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1 A I graduated in 1966 from St. Louis University in 
2 St. Louis, Missouri with a Bachelor's degree in psychology. 
3 I graduated in 1974 with a Master's degree from Chapman 
4 College in Orange, California. I graduated in 1986 with a 
5 Ph.d in educational psychology with a counseling psychology 
6 emphasis from the University of Utah. 
7 I have been employed since 1973 up until the 
8 present in some capacity with psychological surphases. I 
9 worked in California for five years as an instructor at a 
10 community college. I also worked at the same community 
11 college as a veteran's affairs psychometrist at Allan Hancock 
12 Community College. I also worked at the same community 
13 college as an instructor for five years and as a mental 
14 health counselor. I was employed as a consultant at Santa 
15 Maria Joint Union High School District for one year. I 
16 worked for about two-and-a-half years for a psychologist in 
17 California as his psychological assistant. When we moved to 
18 Utah I was employed from 1979 until 1988 by Davis County 
19 Mental Health in Layton, Utah. In 1988 I accepted my current 
20 position at McKay-Dee Psych Resources, which at that point 
21 was called the Behavioral Health Institute at McKay-Dee 
22 Hospital. 
23 Q Great. Thank you very much. Were you involved in 
24 an accident at the intersection of Beverly Way and 12th East 
25 on September 6, 1985? 
A Yes. uAi ilull H 
(Whereupon Exhibit No. 1 was 
marked for identification.) 
Q Most of our deposition today will focus on that 
incident. Let me get into that by showing you a document 
that we will have marked as Exhibit 1. I've handed you 
what's been marked as Deposition Exhibit No. 1, Mrs. Bloss. 
Take a moment to review that, and then let me ask you if you 
can identify it. Can you identify that document? 
A Yes. 
Q Does it bear your signature? 
A Yes. 
Q This is a statement that was given approximately 
two to three weeks ago regarding the accident, and I would 
like to go through it with you. First of all, let me ask you 
how familiar you were in 1985, at the time of the accident, 
with this particular intersection? 
A We'd moved into our house in January of 1985, and 
I probably drove through that intersection approximately once 
a day from that point until the time of the accident and 
since. 
Q Having reviewed this Exhibit 1 today, does it 
accurately contain your recollections about what happened on 
that day when you were involved in the accident? 
A Yes. 
Associated Merit Reporters 
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Q I won't go through the whole thing. I don't think 
that's necessary. Let me ask a couple of follow-up 
questions. Do you recall how high the rose bushes were in 
terms of inches or feet? 
A My recollection is that it would be about three 
feet. 
Q Do you remember whether the rose bushes were in 
bloom or at least had any kind of foliage on them? 
A They had foliage. I don't recollect if they were 
in bloom or not. 
Q They were leafed out? 
A Yes. 
Q Do you recall who the other person involved in the 
accident was? 
A If I recall right, her name was Susan Hoskins. 
Q And could you tell me where in the intersection 
you collided with Mrs. Hoskins or Mrs. Hoskins collided with 
you? 
A My recollection is that we were both entering the 
intersection, and I impacted her car. I was told later that 
I was further into the intersection than she was. 
Q And you were cited for failure to yield? 
A Yes. 
Q Do you specifically recall, as you approached the 
intersection from the north, looking for traffic that may 
Associated Merit Reporters 
1 have been coming from the west, trying to see where the 
2 traffic was coming from the west? 
3 A Specifically? 
4 Q Yes. 
5 A Not specifically. My assumption is I always look 
6 right, look left, look right again and proceed. 
7 Q Did you slow down as you approached the 
8 intersection? 
9 A I'm sure I did. 
10 Q When was the first time you were able to see the 
11 car that was coming from the west, that you recall? 
12 A I was already in the intersection, and I think I 
13 must have checked for the second time to the right and then 
14 saw it. It was at that point that the impact took place. 
15 Q You indicate in Exhibit 1 that you contacted 
16 certain individuals in Bountiful City. 
17 A Yes. 
18 Q Before getting to that, though, let me ask you 
19 this. Was this an accident that was investigated by any 
20 police officers? 
21 A I seem to recall that they took some information 
22 at the scene, but I don't know what you mean by 
23 "investigation". 
24 Q Do you recall that a police officer was called to 
25 the scene of the accident? 
L.A? H U M !••-
A Yes. 
Q Was it a Bountiful City police officer? 
A Yes. 
Q Do you recall making any statements to the police 
officer at the time of the accident about your concerns with 
either the fact that the intersection was unmarked or the 
rose bushes being a problem? 
A No. 
Q Do you recall the name of the officer who talked 
with you? 
A No. But I'm sure it's on some of the documents 
that you have. 
Q Do you recall any conversation with Ms. Hoskins 
about either the lack of signage at the intersection or the 
rose bushes? 
A No. 
Q Did you talk with Ms. Hoskins at the scene of the 
accident? 
A No. 
Q When was the first time you spoke with anyone 
about the rose bushes at the intersection or the lack of 
signage? 
A I know I spoke with my insurance agent about it 
and wrote it in the report that I gave to my insurance 
company, State Farm, the report for both myself and my 
Associated Merit Renorfprq 
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daughter. I also mentioned the rose bushes in a document 
that I submitted to the State of Utah, an accident report. 
At some point I phoned Mr. Forbes here and asked him about 
whether there was some way that I wouldn't be cited for 
failure to yield right-of-way because of the intersection and 
the rose bushes. And my recollection of my conversation with 
him is that he encouraged me to phone Mr. Balling, the city 
engineer. 
I then phoned Mr. Balling. And, as I recall, 
Mr. Balling said to me that a stop sign was placed in 
intersections based upon two things, one was the frequency of 
usage of the intersection and the second would be the 
accident history of the intersection. And that was basically 
all I remember from the conversation. I guess at the time I 
assumed that this intersection didn't meet the criteria of 
either of the two. 
Q Do you recall Mr. Balling telling you that he had 
determined that the intersection didn't warrant a sign or 
that, in the alternative, he would look into it? 
A I don't recall that specifically. I remember 
leaving the conversation with the thought that I had turned 
in the information and then he could do with it as he chose 
to do. 
Q Do you recall how long after the accident you 
spoke with Mr. Forbes and Mr. Balling? 
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1 A I don't have a date on that. I assume it was 
2 within two weeks to a month after the accident, because I 
3 wanted to kind of get everything over and done with. 
4 Q Did you speak with anyone else about the accident? 
5 We've gone over the insurance company and the statement that 
6 was submitted to the State of Utah, or document that was 
7 submitted to the State of Utah, Mr. Balling and Mr. Forbes. 
8 Anyone else that you can recall? 
9 A No. 
10 Q Did you ever talk with Ms. Hoskins about the 
11 accident, call her after the fact ever? 
12 A No. 
13 (Whereupon Exhibit No. 2 was 
14 marked for identification.) 
15 Q Let me show you what's been marked as Exhibit 
16 No. 2, Mrs. Bloss. Would you prefer me to call you Ms. Bloss 
17 or Mrs. Bloss? Tell me if I'm offending you by calling you 
18 Mrs. Bloss. 
19 A You may call me Carol. 
20 Q That's probably the best. I've shown you what's 
21 been marked as Deposition Exhibit No. 2, Carol. If you could 
22 take a look at it, it's a multi-page document. I '.11 say for 
23 the record how many pages it is when I get a chance to put 
24 mine in order. It's a nine-page document. Take your time 
25 and look through it, and then we can talk about it. 
11 
A These are incorrectly stapled, I believe. 
Q Have you noticed the fact that there's a Utah 
driver's part in there with the Farmer's stuff; is that your 
point? 
A This part here was something I submitted to the 
State of Utah. 
Q Two pages? 
A Uh-huh. (Affirmative). 
Q Let's pull that out. 
A I don't know where the back is. 
Q I think I have that right here. I was going to 
separate that. Why don't we pull that out so we have this 
down to be a seven-page document, all which relate to 
statements you made to State Farm either in an interview or 
forms you filled out. So Exhibit No. 2 is now four pages 
involving the recorded interview between you and Mr. West and 
four pages of forms that were filled out and submitted to 
State Farm, two pages of which involve injuries to you and 
two pages of which involve injuries to your daughter, Julie; 
is that correct? 
A Yes. 
Q Let's talk about this statement that was given to 
Mr. West. Have you reviewed this statement prior to today? 
A I've never seen this statement before. I remember 
giving it, but I've never seen it. 
12 
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Q You've now had a chance to review it; is that 
right? 
A Yes. 
Q Is it accurate, to your recollection? Does it 
accurately reflect, to your recollection, what you stated to 
Mr. West? 
A Yes. 
Q And there is a reference on page three of that 
statement to the fact that you told Mr. West, in November of 
1985, that you felt that the rose bushes on the corner of 
Brown's Park and Beverly Way interfered with or obstructed 
the view you had of the other vehicle; is that correct? 
A Yes. 
Q Let's turn to page five of the exhibit, which is 
the first page of the form that you've filled out. Is it for 
yourself or for Julie? 
A The one I have here says "Dorothy Carol Bloss", if 
you drop down to about the middle of the page. Mine says 
"Dorothy Carol Bloss." What does your say? 
Q I just want to make sure we're both looking at the 
same page. Let's talk about the application that you made to 
State Farm. Have you seen this application for benefits 
before? 
A Yes. 
Q Did you keep a copy of it for your own records? 
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A Yes. 
Q And is this document that we've identified as 
Exhibit 2 a true and accurate copy of the document that you 
submitted to State Farm, your insurance company, for those 
benefits? 
A Yes. 
Q I'll note, for the record, that there is a 
reference in block five to the fact that at the time you 
submitted this application for benefits you noted to State 
Farm that the intersection was unmarked and the rose bushes 
on the northwest corner of the intersection obstructed your 
view. 
A Yes. 
Q Both you and your daughter, Julie, were injured in 
this accident; is that correct? 
A We hit the windshield and went to the hospital and 
were checked and released. 
Q Do you recall telling either Mr. Forbes or 
Mr. Balling that you had been injured in the accident? 
A I don't recall. 
Q Do you recall that the police officer 
investigating the accident knew that you had been injured? 
A The paramedics were called, and we were all 
transported by the paramedics to Lake View. 
Q Do you recall whether Ms. Hoskins was injured? 
14 
Associated Merit Reporters 
A Her son, Lance, was injured. I don't recall if 
she or the other children were injured. 
Q Let's take a look at the last two pages of the 
exhibit, which is the application for benefits that you 
submitted to State Farm for your daughter, Julie. And let me 
ask you this. Who filled out these applications for benefits 
for yourself and for your daughter? 
A I did. 
Q And, once again, I note for the record that block 
five of Julie's application also refers to the fact that the 
intersection is unmarked and that there are rose bushes on 
the northwest corner which obstructed your view. Do you 
recall any conversation that you had, at the time of the 
accident or after, with your daughter about the rose bushes 
obstructing your view or her view? 
A Not at that time. We have since. 
Q And did Julie, likewise, feel that the rose bushes 
obstructed the view of the other vehicle? 
A And that it's a dangerous intersection. 
Q Yes to both? 
A Yes. 
(Whereupon Exhibit No. 3 was 
marked for identification.) 
Q I've handed you what's been marked as Deposition 
Exhibit No. 3, Carol. If you could take a look at it and 
15 
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is that correct? 
A Would you repeat the question? 
Q Is it true that, had you observed, you could have 
seen Vehicle 2 further down the road and earlier than at the 
time of the accident? 
A I'm saying that, because of the rose bushes, I 
feel that if Vehicle 2 were in a certain area, a certain 
window, so to speak, that the rose bushes obliterate the 
view. And then I'm right-handed, and I tend to look right 
and then look left and then look right again before I make 
moves with my car. And so I think what happened is, the rose 
bushes obliterated my view in this vicinity. This is also a 
hill, and the rose bushes obstructed my view in this area 
here. I checked here, and by the time I checked the second 
time the car was closer. 
Q You say you normally look right, left and then 
right. 
A Right. 
Q Do you have an independent recollection that 
that's what you did on this day? 
A No. I don't have an independent recollection. 
Q Back to the question. I don't know what the 
distances are, but I'm pointing to --
A My car. 
Q -- your car, and even a little north of the rear 
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turned and saw the glance of it. So — 
MR. FORBES: I believe that's all. 
EXAMINATION 
BY MR. DALBY; 
Q Cindy, what's your current address? 
A 5454 South 3350 West. 
Q I want to direct your attention to Exhibit 1 
again, just a couple of questions. I assume you've been back 
to the accident scene a couple of times since the accident; 
is that right? 
A Yes. 
Q As you've drawn Stan's motorcycle and Mr. Wright's 
vehicle, just prior to the collision, if you were to go back 
to the same spot that you've drawn the motorcycle, would you 
have an unobstructed view of 1200 East? In other words, is 
there anything to obstruct your vision of this incoming 
street where you've drawn the motorcycle? 
A When I went back to it I looked at it and yes, 
there's some bushes or rose bushes or something right here. 
And ™ 
Q Why don't you just draw, put some "R's" where the 
the bushes are? 
A Seems like they're — I can't remember if they go 
this way, too. I put it there and they go this way. 
Q How high would you say those bushes are? Best 
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1I guess is fine. 
2 A I don't know. About as tall as I am. About — 
3 they were really tall ones. They weren't just little, short 
4 ones. They were really tall and it's probably about five to 
5 six feet. I don't know. 
6 Q And these were bushes. Were there any trees or 
7 anything else to block your vision? 
8 A They might have had trees up this way, but I just 
9 remember the rose bushes. 
10 Q When you were talking about your conversation with 
11 Mr. Wright, when Stan went to see him afterwards, the last 
12 thing you said, I believe, and correct me if I'm wrong, Mr. 
13 Wright said he couldn't see you. Is that what you said? 
14 A Yes. 
15 Q Jo you remember Mr. Wright saying that? 
16 A It might have been his mom telling me that. I 
17 just heard that — it might have been his mom. I don't know 
18 if it was actually him or his mom that told me that because I 
19 talked to his mom quite often and it could be that she told 
20 me, "He couldn't see you.11 I don't know. I don't remember. 
21 Q Let me get my directions right. As you were 
22 proceeding eastbound on Beverly Way was there any yield sign 
23 or stop sign in your lane of travel? 
24 A No. 
25 J Q When you went back to the accident scene did you 
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1 within a couple weeks after that — 
2 Q. Okay. 
3 A. of the accident that I had* 
4 Q. This purports to document an accident that 
5 occurred at the intersection of Beverly Way and 1200 East 
6 on August 14, 1987. Is that an accident that you in fact 
7 were involved in? 
8 A. Yes, it is. 
9 Q. Okay. You are the individual that's identified 
10 here as the Kevin P. O'Connell — 
11 A. Yes. 
12 Q. -- driving one of the vehicles? Can you tell me 
13 about the accident. I know the report speaks for itself. 
14 A. Right. 
15 Q. But why don't you tell me what happened. 
16 A. I was driving southbound on 1200 East and came 
17 upon the intersection with Beverly, and I started through 
18 the intersection, basically was almost all the way through 
19 it, and a gentleman came eastbound on Beverly Way and hit 
20 the rear quarter, the very back portion of my car. 
21 Q. Okay. 
22 A. And he hit it hard enough it just basically 
23 turned the car around. 
24 Q. Okay. Do you have any specific recollections 
25 about the condition of the intersection on this day of the 
1 accident? 
2 A. It's always been an intersection with poor 
3 visibility. You can't see very well through it. Your view 
4 is obstructed with rosebushes on one side plus it's an open 
5 intersection, no yield sign no stop sign, nothing* It's 
6 just wide open. 
7 Q. Have you had a chance to go through that 
8 intersection -- let me rephrase that. Prior to this 
9 accident, which I understand occurred approximately a year 
10 after you had moved into the neighborhood --
11 A. Right. 
12 Q. -- had you had an opportunity to use the 
13 intersection before? 
14 A. Oh, numerous times. 
15 Q. You were aware of its condition? 
16 A. Yeah. Like I say, there is a lot of 
17 intersections right through there that are basically the 
18 same way they are not marked or anything. 
19 Q. Okay. 
20 A. That's one of the ways I go home. There is two 
21 different routes I go home, and that's one of the ways I do 
22 I go home from time to time. 
23 | Q. Do you remember specifically recalling, on the 
24 | date of this accident, that you tried to see whether there 
25 | was traffic coming eastbound on Beverly Way? 
1 A. Yes, I did. 
2 Q. And could you see any traffic coming? 
3 A. No. I approached the intersection, and you can 
4 look — at one point, you can look down the hill to see if 
5 anything is out there, and then as soon as you go past that 
6 point, the house — 'til you come along and you see the 
7 house, and then you have a small space, and then you see 
8 the rosebushes. So, unless you look right in there, that's 
9 kind of tough to see. 
10 Q, Okay. Can you describe for me how the rosebushes 
11 appeared to you back on the date of this accident, I mean 
12 how high they were, whether they were in bloom or not, that 
13 type of thing? 
14 A. Yeah. It was August, so they were in bloom, I 
15 mean, the green leaves and everything were on them, yeah. 
16 I don't know how many roses were on them, per se, but they 
17 were in bloom, you know, for that time of year. 
18 Q. Do you recall how high they were? 
19 A. I can't say exactly. I would guess four to five 
20 feet high, somewhere in that range. 
21 Q. Okay. Are you aware of any other accidents that 
22 have occurred at that intersection? 
23 A. When we were involved in the accident, quite a 
24 few of the neighbors came out, and pretty much every one of 
25 them told me there had been probably five or six accidents 
1 in the last two years at that intersection. They said, you 
2 know, it's been a problem, and, you know, they felt it was 
3 a bad intersection. 
4 Q. Okay. Did the police investigate the accident? 
5 A. When the police came, I had left the car in the 
6 road, you know, I didn't move my car. And the officer came 
7 up, and he said, would you please move your car off to 
8 here. He had me pull it over on to Beverly, just above 
9 1200 East. 
10 And I said, well, don't you want to see what 
11 happened as far as determining who is at fault with the 
12 accident? 
13 And he says, no, I have what I need. Please, you 
14 know, pull your car over. So, I did. 
15 Q. Okay. Did you say any — do you remember who 
16 that officer was? 
17 A. Carl -- I think it was Crawl, Carl or Crawl. 
18 Q. Was there any -- did you say anything to the 
19 officer about either the rosebushes or the yield or stop 
20 sign or any other problems with the intersection? 
21 A. Well, I talked with him a little bit, because 
22 after we got into the car and started filling out the 
23 report, he starts writing me a ticket. And I felt that I 
24 shouldn't be the one cited in the accident. 
25 And he said, yes, you failed to yield to the 
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1 right and you are going to be cited. And I tried to 
2 explain to him that I was basically through the 
3 intersection, and I felt the other party was at fault. 
4 And he says, no, Utah law says you didn't yield 
5 to the right, you are responsible. And after he gave me my 
6 ticket and, you know, we finished filling out the report, I 
7 said, you know, some of the neighbors have told me about 
8 accidents happening here, and I feel it's not a very good 
9 intersection. 
10 And I asked him what he thought should be done, 
11 and at that time he answered he thought some kind of a 
12 yield sign or something should be put up there. And he 
13 basically agreed with me, it wasn't a very good 
14 intersection, you know, because I told him then, I believe, 
15 that the, you know, rosebushes obstructed your view, and 
16 there is no kind of sign at all there. 
17 Q. Okay. And that was at the scene of the accident? 
18 A. Yes. 
19 Q. Do you believe the accident would have occurred 
20 if the rosebushes hadn't been there? 
21 A. I feel I would have had a lot better chance to 
22 see someone, because it's right there as you drive and 
23 approach it in your field of vision. You look off to the 
24 right to see, and you are basically in the intersection 
25 before you can see again as to anyone coming up the road. 
1 Q. Okay. Now, you mentioned that you were cited fo 
2 failure to yield? 
3 A. Yes. 
4 Q. Did you eventually end up making a court 
5 appearance on that? 
6 A. Yes, I did. 
7 Q. Tell me about that. What happened at that time? 
8 A. Well, originally, I went down before the court 
9 appearance and complained to the police department that I 
10 felt, you know, the officer was totally wrong in giving me 
11 a ticket to start with. 
12 Q. Okay. do you recall who you talked to? 
13 A. I believe it was a Sgt. Winters or Winter. I 
14 can't remember his exact name. 
15 Q. Do you recall when that was? 
16 A. It was within a week to two weeks of the 
17 accident, a week or ten days, because I had my ticket, and 
18 I would have to pay it. 
19 Q. Let me -- that is brings us to this exhibit. I 
20 have handed you, Mr. O'Connell, what's been marked as 
21 Deposition Exhibit No. 2, which consists of your 
22 exhibit -- consists of two original pages, one being a 
23 yellow copy of a ticket that it appears was written to you 
24 on the date of the accident, and the other being a 
25 receipt. 
1 Does this help place, in your mind, the 
2 conversation that you had with the other individual at the 
3 police department? 
4 (Whereupon Exhibit No. 2 was 
5 identified in the record.) 
6 A. Yeah. I know I went down and paid this during 
7 the day, of course on the 28th, and I can't remember if it 
8 was that day or the next day. It would have been during 
9 that same week I went back, because the officer that I had 
10 to talk to, the sergeant that I had to talk to was a night 
11 sergeant, and he was not on during the day. And I went 
12 back down late one afternoon and talked to him when the 
13 shift changed. 
14 Q. I see. Now, there is -- on your original, there 
15 is a little handwritten note on the top of the ticket, 
16 which says Sgt. Winter. Is that your writing? 
17 A* Yes. That's my writing, because I was calling 
18 him when I had the ticket, finding out who I would have to 
19 talk with. 
20 Q. I see. 
21 A. Because it really upset me, you know, from the 
22 first day, that I even had a ticket, so --
23 Q. And what did Sgt. Winters say when you talked to 
24 hira? 
25 A. He basically told me the same thing Officer Crawl 
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1 had told me, that I had failed to yield to the right, and 
2 there was nothing anyone could do, you know, and I had 
3 already decided before that to go to court anyway, so I 
4 just figured I would wait and go to court. 
5 Q. Okay. Did you specifically talk with Sgt. Winter 
6 about the rosebushes? 
7 A. Yes. I told him basically the same thing I told 
8 the officer, I felt it was a bad intersection and something 
9 really should be done about it. And, you know, he listened 
10 to what I had to say but really didn't offer much after 
11 that as to if something would be done or not. 
12 Q. Okay. After the time you spoke with Sgt. Winter, 
13 did you eventually make an appearance on your ticket? 
14 A. Yes, I did. 
15 Q. Okay, when was that? Do you recall? 
16 A. It was probably a month or two after that, 
17 because I know they didn't give me a court date right 
18 away. I can't remember it, to be honest with you, the 
19 exact date of the court appearance. 
20 Q. Do you have any records that would help you with 
21 that? 
22 A. The only thing I could -- I really don't have 
23 anything. I really don't. I know it was probably in 
24 October, if I remember correctly. October, or November at 
25 the latest. 
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GOICOECHEA LAW OFFICES 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
4516 South 700 East, Suite 280 
P.O. Box 17345 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84107 
Telephone: (801) 261-0088 
IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, DAVIS COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
STANLEY C. JONES, by and through ] 
his guardian, RAYLENE P. JONES# 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
BOUNTIFUL CITY CORP., a Municipal 
Corporation, and John Does I 
through III, 
Defendants. 
i M O T I O N 
I T O 
1 C O N T I N U E 
i Civil No. 44129 
i Judge Douglas Cornaby 
The Plaintiff, through his undersigned counsel, moves 
for continuance of the Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment 
pursuant to 'Rule 56(f) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
This Motion is based on the fact that prior to the 
receipt by the Plaintiff of Defendant's Motion for Summary 
Judgment, Plaintiff sent to the Defendant his Requests for 
Production of Documents and Notice of Depositions of key 
individuals within the Bountiful City Corporation with knowledge 
concerning duties undertaken by Bountiful City to regulate the 
growth of foliage on Rowena Beaver's property. The degree to 
which Bountiful City had notice of the obstruction of vision 
presented by the foliage is presently unknown. Whether Bountiful 
City undertook a duty to enforce a certain height for the foliage 
UA? HU1 J iJ 
and the scope of that duty is also unknown. The outstanding 
discovery seeks to uncover facts showing that Bountiful City had 
notice that foliage growing on private property obstructed the 
vision of drivers using the intersection of Beverly Way and 1200 
East and/or that Bountiful City undertook responsibility to 
inform the private property owner of the hazard and enforce 
notices provided to the private property owner regulating the 
height of the foliage. 
The responses to the outstanding discovery directly 
affect the issues raised by Bountiful in its Motion for Summary 
Judgment* The present lack of information sought in the 
discovery requests precludes, to some extent, presentation by the 
Plaintiff of affidavit facts essential to justify opposition to 
the Motion. As such, under Rule 56(f) proper consideration of 
the issues raised by Bountiful City in its Motion for Summary 
Judgment should be continued until these key facts are known. 
DATED THIS _££ DAY OF FEBRUARY, 1991. 
GOICOECHEA LAW OFFICES 
BRIAN S. KING 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
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MATTHEW J. STOREY 
4516 South 700 East, 
Suite 280 
The Aspenwood 
P.O. Box 17345 
Salt Lake City, UT 84117-
7345 
Salt Lake City 
(801)261-0088 
FAX* 
[801] 269-9987 
Toll Free Outside Area 
Nationwide 
1-800-999-LAW4 
Office Locations 
COLORADO 
Oenver 
IDAHO 
Boise 
Burley 
Coeur d Alene 
Idaho Falls 
Lewtston 
Nampa 
Pocateilo 
Twin Falls 
UTAH 
Ogden 
Provo 
Salt Lake City 
West Valley 
WASHINGTON 
Spokane 
EXHIBIT e _ 
Goicoechea Law Offices 
SALT LAKE CITY 
A Partnership with Professional Corporation 
March 19, 1991 
Honorable Judge Douglas Cornaby 
100 North 650 West 
Farmington, Utah 84025 
Re: Jones v. Bountiful City Corp. 
Civil No. 44129 
lORPORATE OFFICES 
Boise Idaho 
Dear Judge Cornaby: 
On February 26, 1991, at the conclusion of the hearing 
on Bountifulfs Motion for Summary Judgment and Stan 
Jones' Motion for Continuance in the above referenced 
case, you took under advisement consideration of the 
Motions and indicated that you would await filing by 
Jones of a Supplemental Memorandum if and when facts 
came to light prior to the discovery cutoff that shed 
light on the issues raised in Bountiful1s Motion and 
the Memorandum we submitted in opposition thereto. 
Discovery has proceeded by both parties since the 
hearing and there is significant outstanding discovery 
to be responded to. By this letter, I want to inform 
the Court and opposing counsel that we do plan on 
submitting a Supplemental Memorandum of Facts and Law 
that I believe will clearly establish that Bountiful1s 
Motion for Summary Judgment should be denied. 
My purpose in writing this letter is, first, to confirm 
that no ruling on Bountiful*s Motion will issue until 
supplemental information is provided by the parties 
and, second, to propose a time frame for submitting 
that additional material. The discovery cutoff in the 
case is scheduled for Monday, April 22. I propose that 
any materials we will be submitting be due on Monday, 
the 29th and the reply from Bountiful City be due 
Monday, May 6. 
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March 19, 1991 
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I appreciate your consideration of this issue. 
Sincerely, 
GOICOECHEA LAW OFFICES 
Brian ^. King 
BSK/jh 
cc: Layne Forbes 
